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stantially to his death, it amounts to a superseding cause in a suit
against B. There is no superseding cause in the first instance as an
innocent party is the deceased, but in the second case the person killed
was a wilful participant who chose to enter the race.
In summary, it is conceded that the defendant's participation in the
game of "roulette" amounted to wanton, reckless conduct and that
such is often the basis for a conviction of involuntary manslaughter.
If one of the defendants had fired the gun and somehow missed himself and hit Britch, then a conviction would be warranted.3 6 Further,
the state does have an interest in the protection of the lives of its citizens. 37 But to warrant a conviction for involuntary manslaughter, the
state, without benefit of any statute making this specific conduct unlawful, is necessarily bound by the limits of causation. And where an
intervening force establishes itself as the superseding cause of death,
a defendant should be relieved of liability. Such a superseding cause
is established where a deceased without any compulsion and by his
own act, points a gun to his head and pulls the trigger, thereby causing his own death.
JAMEs A. GORRY, III

CONVICT'S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL ON A
PENDING INDICTMENT
A prosecutor has the duty of seeing that an accused is not deprived
of constitutional rights or privileges.' The fulfillment of this duty,
insofar as it relates to the guarantee of a speedy trial, 2 presents some
difficulties when the accused is already incarcerated for another offense.
The recent Ohio case of Partsch v. Haskins3 involved an accused
who was seeking release on the grounds that he had been denied his
,"In such a situation, defendant's behavior would cause the death of another
person, and the causation required between defendant's act and the resulting death
for a conviction of involuntary manslaughter would be satisfied.
"People v. Freudenberg, 121 Cal. App. 2d 564, 263 P.2d 875, 887 (Dist. Ct. App.
1953); Indiana v. Plaspohl, 239 Ind. 324, 157 N.E.2d 579 (1959); Commonwealth v.

Atencio, 189 N.E.2d

223, 224

(Mass. 1963).

'United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 ( 3 d Cir. 1953); De Gesualdo
v. People, 147 Colo. 426, 364 P.2d 374 (1961); State v. Jackson, 227 La. 642, 8o So. 2d
1o5 (1955); Smith v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 585, 121 N.E.2d 707 (1954); State
v. King, 222 S.C, io8, 71 S.E.2d 793 (1952); Watson v. State, 195 Wis. 166, 217 N.W.

653 (1928).
!'U.S. Const. amend. VI. The right to a speedy trial is also generally guaranteed
by state constitutional or statutory provisions. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 467(2)
(1961).
3175 Ohio St. 139, 191 N.E.2d 922 (1963).
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right to a speedy trial4 on a pending indictment while he was imprisoned in Florida and Ohio for other offenses. In September, 1951
petitioner was indicted in Medina County, Ohio for forgery, but
having left the state he could not be arraigned and tried. In 1952 he
was convicted of forgery in Florida and sentenced for a term of two
years. Escaping to Ohio in 1953, he was arrested for commiting forgery
in Wayne County and sentenced to the Ohio Penitentiary, where detainers were put on him. 5 After his release in Ohio on parole, he was
returned to Florida. Upon completing his sentence in Florida, he returned to Akron, Ohio, and in February 1958, he was given his final
release from the Wayne County sentence. In October 1961 he was
arrested in Medina County, and when brought before the court, he
entered a plea of guilty to the charges in the 1951 indictment and
was sentenced to the Ohio Penitentiary. In 1963 the prisoner sought
his release by an original petition for habeas corpus in the Supreme
Court of Ohio. The court held that the petitioner had waived his
right to a speedy trial by not demanding a trial.6 However, a dissenting judge thought that the prosecuting authorities in Medina County
had a duty to seek return of the petitioner from Florida or removal
from the Ohio Penitentiary in order to give him a speedy trial on the
7
1951 indictment and would have issued the writ.
The accused's right to a speedy trial arises in two situations: (i)
while incarcerated in a jurisdiction other than the one where the indictment is pending; and (2) while incarcerated in an institution located in the same jurisdiction. The rule in most jurisdictions is that
an accused waives a right to a speedy trial, unless he demands the
trial.8 In a few jurisdictions an accused does not have to demand a
'Ohio Const. art. i, § io; Ohio Rev. Code tit. 29, §§ 2945-71-2945-73 (1958).
'Detainers were placed against petitioner by the State of Florida, the Sheriff
of Medina County, and the Police Department of the city of Cleveland, Ohio; the
first was filed on December 3, 1953 and the latter two on December 11, 1953.
' T17he court also held that "even assuming petitioner had made a demand for
a speedy trial, when he entered his plea of guilty in 1961, it amounted to a
withdrawal of such demand and waived his right to insist on the constitutional
provisions relating to a speedy trial." 191 N.E.2d at 923.
7
Id. at 924 (dissenting opinion). See Ohio Rev. Code tit. 29, §§ 2941.40-2941"43
(removal of convict from Ohio Penitentiary), 2963.05 (extradition by executive
agreement of person imprisoned in another state) (1958).
6E.g., Shepherd v. United States, 163 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1947); Pines v. District
Court, 233 Iowa 1284, 10 N.W.2d 574 (1943); Harris v. State, 194 Md. 288, 71 A.-d
36 (195o); see Arnot. 57 A.L.R.2d. 3o02, 326 (1958). This doctrine is usually applied
to an accused even though he may be in the penitentiary serving a sentence for
another crime. E.g., Hottle v. District Court, 233 Iowa 904, 11 N.W.2d 30 (1943);
State v. McTague, 173 Minn. 153, 216 N.W. 787 (1927). The court in the principal
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trial in order to procure his constitutional or statutory right to a
speedy trial. 9
Under the majority rule, followed in both the State and the Federal courts, a failure to bring an accused to trial under an indictment
pending in one jurisdiction while he is in the lawful custody of another jurisdiction does not deprive him of his right to a speedy trial. 10
Under the minority rule, the accused does have a right to a speedy
trial, and there is an obligation to make application for extradition
although it will be good cause for delay if the other sovereignty refuses to extradite."
There are two reasons for the majority rule: (i) By voluntarily
leaving the jurisdiction and by committing a crime in another jurisdiction, an accused becomes himself responsible for the situation and
so cannot complain; 12 and (2) the jurisdiction in which the indictment
is pending is not in full control of the situation. 13 In regard to the
latter reason, it was said in Ex Parte Schechtel' 4 that the only way the
case gave the usual reason for its use by saying that the constitutional provisions
were "not intended as a shield to the guilty, the protection of which might be
invoked by sitting silently back and allowing the prosecution to believe that the
accused is acquiescing in the delay." 191 N.E.2d at 923; Hernandez v. State, 40
Ariz. 2oo, ii P.2d 356, 357 (1932).
OE.g., People v. Prosser, 3og N.Y.

.53, i3o N.E.2d 891 (1955); State v. Dodson,

226 Ore. 458, 360 P.2d 782 (ig6i); See Annot., 57 A.L.R.d 302, 334 (1958). Although
Federal courts generally use the demand doctrine, a few have refused to use it.
United States v. Dillon, 183 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 196o); United States v. Chase,
135 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1955). As pointed out by the court in People v. Prosser,
supra, the burden of obtaining a prompt trial should be placed on the prosecuting
authorities for unlike the accused, they have the actual power to bring the indictment on for trial. In the Prosser case the court said: "The actual result of the
present decision, therefore, is merely to impose upon the officers, charged with
enforcing the law and who secured the indictment, the quite reasonable, far from
burdensome, duty of noticing it for trial." 13o N.E.2d at 896. A fortiori, the rule
should be applied to a prisoner. E.g., Fulton v. State, 178 Ark. 841, 12 S.V.d 777
(1929); Ex parte Chalfant, 81 W. Va. 93, 93 S.E. 1032 (1917). Indeed, some of the

courts that recognize the demand doctrine in other situations, make an exception
in this instance, realizing that such an accused has no opportunity to properly
demand a trial. E.g., United States v. Chase, supra; Ex parte State, 255 Ala. 443, 52
SO. 2d 158 (1951).
"E0..g., United States v. Jackson, 134 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Ky. 1955); Ex parte
Schechtel, 103 Colo. 77, 82 P.2d 762 (1938); State v. Larkin, 256 Minn. 314, 98
N.V.2d 70 (1959); People v. Peters, 198 Misc. 956, ioi N.Y.S.2d 755 (Columbia County
Ct. 1951); Raine v. State, 143 Tenn. 158, 226 S.V. 189 (1920).
"ITaylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Pellegrini v. Wolfe, 225
Ark. 459, 283 S.W.2d 162 (1955).

"Shepherd v. United States, 163 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1947); Accardo v. State, 39
Ala. App. 453, 102 So. 2d 913 (1958).
"3Ex parte Schechtel, 103 Colo. 77, 82 P.2d 762 (1938); Raine v. State, 143 Tenn.
168, 226 S.W. 189 (1920).
'103 Colo. 77, 82 P.2d 762, 764 (1938).
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right to a speedy trial could apply to such an accused is if the demanding state has an unqualified and absolute right to require the
United States to release the accused for trial before the demanding
state's court. But the general rule for both the Federal and the
State systems of courts is that "the court which first takes the subjectmatter of the litigation into its control, whether this be person or
property, must be permitted to exhaust its remedy.., before the other
court shall attempt to take it for its purpose."'35 The demanding
jurisdiction, therefore, does not have full control, and so it is not required to make application for extradition,1 6 notwithstanding that
extradition may be granted if it were sought.' 7
Under the minority rule, an accused has the right to a speedy trial
in this situation; but he will waive his right if he does not demand a
trial.' s The courts using this rule recognize that the demanding jurisdiction lacks full control of the situation, but do not give it controlling weight because: (i) It is desirable to hold the trial while
witnesses can be procured and memories are fresh;' 9 (2) extradition
involves fewer difficulties than formerly; 20 and (3) the harmonious and
effective operation of both the Federal and the State systems of courts
requires a spirit of reciprocal comity and mutual assistance.2 '
An accused's right to a speedy trial on a pending indictment when
he is imprisoned in the same jurisdiction for another offense is treated
differently. A few decisions have held that such an accused does not
have the right to a speedy trial on a pending indictment, usually on
nPonzi v. Fessenden,

258 U.S. 254, 260

(1922).

1
'Commonwealth
1

v. Watson, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 19o (1958); see note io supra.
Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922) (the United States Attorney General
may consent to the transfer of a federal prisoner to a state court for trial); Uniform Criminal Extradition Act § 5 makes it a matter of discretion with the state
governor to have a prisoner removed. 9 U.L.A. 295-96 (1957). Forty-three states have
adopted the act. 9 U.L.A. 116 (Supp. 1962).

1Pellegrini v. Wolfe, 225 Ark. 459, 283 S.W.2d 162 (1955); see note 8 supra.
In addition, a state which is a party to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
is required to bring a prisoner from another party state to trial on a pending indictment within i8o days, only after the accused has taken certain designated steps.
E.g., N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:i 59 A-3 (Supp. 1962). Connecticut, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania are parties to the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers. See generally, People v. Esposito, 37 Misc. 2d 386, 238 N.Y.S.2d 460
(Queens County Ct. ig6o).
1Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1956); see People v. Prosser, 3o9 N.Y. 353, 13o N.E.2d 891, 893-94 (1955).
'Uniform Criminal Extradition Act § 5 removes previous legal doubt concerning return to the asylum state of a prisoner extradited to another state to stand
trial. 9 U.L.A. 295 (x957). In addition, transportation and communication are less
difficult than formerly.
nPonzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922).
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the grounds that the statute guaranteeing the right applies only to
22
one in jail or out on recognizance, not to one in the penitentiary.
Under the majority rule, followed in both the State and the Federal courts, a sovereignty may not deny an accused person a speedy
trial, even though he is incarcerated for another offense in one of that
sovereignty's penal institutions. 23 But if the accused fails to demand
a trial, he waives his right.24 It is important that such an accused
have a trial "while witnesses are available and memories fresh." 25 The
courts that follow this rule also recognize that even if statutes do not
apply to this situation, the provision of the Constitution guaranteeing a speedy trial does apply. 26 Finally, the sovereignty is in full control of the situation, and there is no reason why it could not dispose
of the pending charges.27
Therefore, a prosecutor does not have the duty to seek extradition
of an accused incarcerated in another jurisdiction for another offense.
But he has a duty to have an accused incarcerated in the same jurisdiction for another offense removed for trial on a pending indictment,
if the accused demands a trial. It is submitted that an accused should
not have to demand a trial in order to procure his right to a speedy
trial. 28 In addition, an accused should have the right to a speedy trial
on a pending indictment while imprisoned in another jurisdiction,
and the prosecutor should have an obligation to protect the right
by at least making application for extradition. 2
JAMtEs L. SURrAcr
"'E.g., Gillespie v. People, 176 Ill. 238, 52 N.E. 250 (1898); see Annot., i18 A.L.R.
1037, 1044 (1939).
23
E.g., Rader v. People, 139 Colo. 397, 334 P.2d 437 (1959); Ex parte Schechtel,
103 Colo. 77, 82 P.2d 762 (1938); State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 98 Pac. 122 (1908);
see Annot., 118 A.L.R. 1037 (1939).
2

'See note 8 supra.

'People v. Prosser, 39 N.Y. 533, 13o N.E.2d 891, 894 (1955).

"[S]uch a person is still entitled to a speedy trial and the standard accepted
by the legislature for the one situation may be considered by the court where a
person is confined in the penitentiary." State v. Milner, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 285, 149
N.E.2d 189, 192 (Ct. C.P. 1958).
'Ex parte Schechtel, 103 Colo. 77, 82 P.2d 762, 764 (1938); Commonwealth v.
Watson, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 190, 193 (1958).
n8The argument for the demand doctrine, in note 8 supra, is not a realistic
one, for the state has the power to bring the indictment on for trial and, therefore,
can prevent procastination by the accused. See note 9 supra; Orfield, Criminal
Procedure From Arrest to Appeal 383-384 (1947) (preparation of trial calendars is
exercised by the prosecuting attorney).
"See text at notes 18-21 supra. Of course an accused can waive his constitutional
or statutory right to a speedy trial, if he so desires. Levine v. United States, 182
F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 195o); see Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302, 307 (1958). But, "the fact
that a defendant in an indictment is in prison serving a sentence for another
crime gives him no immunity from the second prosecution." Ponzi v. Fessenden,
258 U.S. 254, 264 (1922).
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RELIABLE INFORMERS AND CORROBORATION
"Probable cause,"' one of the most illusive concepts in the field
of criminal law, is the essential requisite for a valid search or arrest.
A search generally must be made in conjunction with a search
warrant, but all searches made without a warrant are not illegal. 2 The
fourth amendment of the Federal Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches 3 conducted without a warrant,4 but those which are reasonable are not forbidden. 5 A search without a warrant may be reasonable where it is incidental to a lawful arrest; 6 and the search is not in'Probable cause may be defined as follows: "[A]reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he
is charged." 47 Am. Jr. Searches and Seizures § 22 at 516 ('943).
'Cannon v. United States, 158 F.2d 952 (5 th Cir. 1946); United States v. Pierce,
124 F. Supp. 264 (N.D. Ohio 1954); United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal.
1949); Joyner v. State, 157 Fla. 874, 27 So. 2d 349 (1946); Hubin v. State, i8o Md. 279,
23 A.2d 706 (1942); Edwards v. State, 83 Okla. Crim. 340, 177 P.2d 143 (1947).
OUnited States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925); Roberson v. United States, 165 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1948); United
States v. Kaplan, 286 Fed. 963 (S.D. Ga. 1923).
In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme Court stated,
"The ... Fourth Amendment... put the courts of the United States and Federal
officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints [and] . . . forever secure[d] the people, their persons, houses, papers and
effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This
protection reaches all alike . . . and the duty of giving to it force and effect is
obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of
the laws." Id. at 391, 392.
Although Weeks did not extend the fourth amendment to the states, the foundation was laid for Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U-S. 643 (1961), which held that the fourth
amendments provisions against unreasonable searchs and seizures are enforceable
against the states.
'Best v. United States, 184 F.ad 131 (st Cir. 195o), cert. denied, 340 US. 939
(1951); Joyner v. State, supra note a.
rDistrict of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Church v. State, 151
Fla. 24, 9 So. ad 164 (194);$oles v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 216, 20oo S.W.2d 467

(1947).

A search which is not unreasonable may be made without a warrant. Mat-

thews v. State, 67 Okla. Crim. 203, 93 P.ad 549 (939)The reasonableness of a search is to be resolved according to the facts of each
case, and not by any fixed formula. United States v. Rabinowitz, supra note 3; Martin v. United States, 183 F.ad 436 ( 4 th Cir. 1950); Willoughby v. Commonwealth, 313
Ky. 291, 231 S.W.ad 79 (1950).
0
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 3o7 (1959); United States v. Rabinowitz, supra
note 3; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Aguello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20 (1925); United States v. Pisano, 193 F.ad 361 (7 th Cir. 1961); United States
v. Hirsch, 57 F.ad 555 (W.D.N.Y. 1932) (dictum); Trowbridge v. Superior Court,
4-1 Cal. App. ad 13, 300 P.ad 222 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); People v. Coleman, 134
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7
validated merely because it precedes rather than follows the arrest.
If a search is illegal at its inception, it cannot be validated by the
fruits of the search;8 and even a discovery of contraband during an
illegal search is not sufficient to validate a search without probable
cause. 9 Moreover, if an unlawful search is commenced, the procurement of a warrant thereafter will not legalize what has been invalid
from its inception. 10
An arrest, on the other hand, may be made with or without a
warrant where the facts are sufficient to establish probable cause; but
if the information at the officer's disposal is insufficient to justify the
issuance of a warrant for arrest, an arrest with no warrant, or with an
invalid warrant, is illegal."
The burden on the state to prove that probable cause existed for
an arrest or search is often difficult to sustain due to the obscurity of

Cal. App. 2d 594, 286 P.2d 582 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Mixon v. State, 54 So. 2d 19o
(Fla. 5951); People v. Edge, 406 Ill. 490, 94 N.E.2d 359 (1950).
A search made without a warrant is illegal where it is made after the arrest
has been completed so that it is no longer an incident of the arrest. United States
v. Coffman, 5o F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Cal. 1943); Page v. State, 208 Miss. 347, 44 So. 2d
459 (195o).
An attempt to arrest may be sufficient to validate a search, if the person whose
arrest was sought escapes. United States v. Elliott Hall Farm, 42 F- Supp. 235 (D.N.J.
1941).
7Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Carroll v. United States, supra
note 3; People v. Torres, 56 Cal. 2d 864, 366 P.2d 823 (1961); People v. Ingle, 53 Cal.
2d 407, 348 P.2d 577 (196o); People v. Hammond, 54 Cal. 2d 846, 357 P.2d 289 (196o);
Joyner v. State, supra note 2.
"'The proposition that the evidence which is found justifies the arrest or
the seizure is a specious argument and has no support except in one or two illconsidered district court cases. To use a homely phrase, it is an attempt to pull one's
self up by his own bootstraps," Carroll v. United States, supra note 3 at 140, 141United States v. Roberts, go F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Tenn 1950); People v. Gale,
46 Cal. 2d 253, 294 P.2d 13 (1956); People v. Silvestri, 150 Cal. App. 2d 114, 309
P.2d 871 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); People v. Mills, 148 Cal. App. 2d 392, 306 P.2d IOO5
(Dist. Ct. App. 1957); People v. Goodo, 147 Cal. App. 2d 7, 304 P.2d 776 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1956); People v. Harris, 146 Cal. App. 2d 142, 304 P.2d 178 (Dist Ct. App.
1956); People v. Moore, 14o Cal. App. 2d 870, 295 P.2d 969 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956);
Collins v. State, 65 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1953); People v. Parren, 24 Ill. 2d 572, 182 N.E.2d
662 (1962); People v. Mayo, 19 Ill. 2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 44o (1960); People v. Martin,
382 Ill. 192, 46 N.E.2d 997 (1942); Adams v. State, 2o2 Miss. 68, 3o So. 2d 593
(1947).

9Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d
94 (4th Cir. 1962); Carr v. United States, 59 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1932); People v. Dalpe,
371 Ill. 607, 21 N.E.2d 756 (1939).
1

People v. Scaramuzzo, 352 Ill. 248, 185 N.E. 578 (1933).
2Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1948).
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the line between mere suspicion and probable cause. 12 Perhaps in
no other field of crime does this line present such a formidable barrier
as in narcotics violations. Due to the diminutive size of the contraband, the suspect can destroy it with relative ease. The investigating
officer, therefore, must often act expeditiously because it is essential
to seize the contraband in order to support a conviction. Consequently,
many arrests for narcotics offenses are made without warrants. 13 Irrespective of the exigencies of the situation, however, there must be
probable cause to justify the officer's action, or the conduct, though
commendable, will be illegal. Since detection of narcotics offenses is
difficult, law enforcement agencies often depend on information
furnished by informers.' 4 Absent a warrant, probable cause is determined at the time of arrest; and therefore, such arrests must be
justified by factsl 5 known or observed'0 by the arresting officer, or by
1-"That [troublesome] line [between mere suspicion and probable cause]
necessarily must be drawn by an act of judgment formed in the light of the particular situation and with account taken of all the circumstances." Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 16o, 176 (1949).
IsThe statute authorizing agents to make arrests without warrants for violation of narcotic drug laws is Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7607(2), as amended, 70 Stat.
570 (1956).
"In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Clark stated that illegal traffic in
narcotic drugs is an exceedingly serious problem and, "Moreover, it is a most
difficult crime to detect and prove. Because drugs come in small pills or powder
and are readily packaged in capsules or glassine containers, they may be easily
concealed. They can be carried on the person or even in the body crevasses where
detection is almost impossible. Enforcement is, therefore, most difficult without the
use of 'stool pigeons' or informants." Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 66 (1957).
':"The facts necessary to uphold an arrest without a warrant must be sufficiently strong to support the issuance of a warrant for arrest." Worthington v.
United States, supra note ii at 565; Wakkuri v. United States, 67 F.2d 844, 845
(6th Cir. 1933); United States v. Castle, 138 F. Supp. 436, 439 (D.D.C. 1955).
"Cases in which observations by police led to subsequent arrests are: United
States v. Kansco, 252 F.2d 220 (!zd Cir. 1958) (after observing the defendant, an
agent approached the defendant and noticed that he was startled and agitated);
Green v. United States, 259 F.2d i8o (D.C. Cir. 1958) (officers observed the appellant
walking with a known narcotics addict; and when they called to the two men, the
appellant ran); Rent v. United States, 209 F.2d 893 (sth Cir. 1954) (a federal officer
observed appellant smoking a marijuana cigarette); Cavness v. United States, 187
F.2d 719 (gth Cir. 1951) (defendant forcibly resisted the officer's approach and
attempted to destroy an inhaler tube); United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 65o
(2d Cir. 1945) (defendant dropped a bottle as officers questioned him); Brady v.
United States, 148 F.2d 394 (9 th Cir. 1945) (after observing appellant, officers saw
his wife drop a package); Yip Wah v. United States, 8 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1925)
(officers observed tins of opium fall from a broken trunk accompanied by the
appellant); United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe, 139 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Pa.
1956) (defendant operated a car suspiciously and drove away when officers attempted
to stop him); United States v. Horton, 86 F. Supp. 92 (W.D. Mich. 1949) (defendant
attempted to hide something under an automobile seat when officers approached).
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reliance upon the information supplied by informers with or without
corroborative evidence.
The problem of establishing probable cause based on information
from an informer not known to be reliable was considered in the recent California case of People v. Cedeno.17 Louise Friend voluntarily
supplied the police with information concerning the defendant whom
she believed to be a dealer in narcotics. Prior to this time, Miss Friend
was unknown to the arresting officers, and even though information
had previously been received from her, no arrests had been made in
reliance thereon. Under police guidance, Miss Friend entered the defendant's hotel for the sole purpose of purchasing narcotics. She returned with one marijuana cigarette which she turned over to the
police and said that the contraband was obtained from the defendant.
Two days later, Miss Friend again attempted to make a purchase from
the defendant, but he was not in when she called. Upon returning to
the police car, she saw and identified the driver of a passing car as
being the defendant. She stated that she had been in his apartment
that day and that marijuana was everywhere. Sixteen hours later, the
police went to the defendant's room. When the defendant attempted
to resist the officers' intrusion, they forcibly entered the apartment
without a search warrant or warrant of arrest, and finding marijuana
therein, placed the defendant under arrest.
The People contended that the information obtained from the informer plus the existence of corroborative facts' s established probable
cause. The defendant's principal contention was that Miss Friend was
not a reliable informer and that there was not sufficient corroboration
of the information received from her to support a finding of probable
cause to validate the arrest.
On appeal from a Superior Court conviction, the First District
Court of Appeals for the state of California reversed, saying that Miss
Friend was not a reliable informer, so that a conviction could be
based on her uncorroborated information. 19 The court reasoned that
for an informer to be considered reliable, the officer must not only
know the informer, but the officer must have a strong belief, based
1732 Cal. Rptr. 246 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
5

8The corroborative facts relied upon by the prosecution were: (i) the informer's purchase of the marijuana cigarette and her statement that it had been obtained from the defendant; (2) the identification by the informer of the defendant
in a passing car; and (3) the informer's statement concerning the presence of
marijuana in the defendant's room. Id. at 252.
w"A reliable informer apparently means a person whose information has in
the past led the police to valid suspects." People v. Dawson, i5o Cal. App. 2d 11g,
31o P.2d i6f, 168 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).

1964]

CASE COMMENTS

137

on past experience with the informer, that the information is trustworthy. While past experience is not the only guide to the reliability
question, the information obtained from the informer must be verified
in some manner from other sources to establish the informer's relia20
bility.
Relying upon People v. Lawton,21 the People argued that even
though the informant may not be known to be reliable, the information in combination with the defendant's furtive and suspicious conduct-refusing to admit the officers-established the grounds for probable cause. The Lawton 22 case is distinguishable, however, for there
the officers had probable cause for the defendant's arrest and the search
of his apartment due to the discovery of substantial corroborative
facts2 3 prior to having forcibly entered the apartment. In the present
case, the officers failed to discover any substantial corroborative facts
prior to their entry.
People v. Gonzales24 shows the type of evidence that will sufficiently
corroborate information obtained from an informer not known to be
reliable. In that case, the informant was subjected to a thorough
search immediately before acquiring the narcotics. The police did not
observe the actual transaction, but the sources from which the narcotics possessed by the informer could have been obtained were limited.
Here the narcotics were obtained in a private dwelling, while in the
principal case, the contraband was acquired in a hotel.
A recent federal decision involving an unreliable informer and
insufficient corroboration of the information is the Fifth Circuit case
of Carter v. United States.25 This case concerns a search of a moving
automobile, which is an exception 20 to the general rule that unless incident to valid arrest, a search is unlawful if performed without a
warrant. Treasury Agent Williams had received information concerning Carter on three previous occasions, but searches of Carter's car
in reliance on the information proved it false in each instance. Williams, while driving to investigate another assignment, encountered
°Supra note 17, at 251.
n1 8 6 Cal. App. 2d 834, 9 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Dist. Ct. App. i96o).
mIbid.
2rhe corroborative facts discovered by the police were: (1) the defendant's
ownership of a described automobile bearing a certain license number; (2) defendant's having driven his automobile in the area in question; (3) defendant's contact with two known narcotic users; and (4) the narcotics record of the defendant.
11186 Cal. App. 2d 79, 8 Cal. Rptr. 704 (Dist. Ct. App. ig6o).
5314 F.2d 386 (5 th Cir. 1963).
OThis exception has not received the support of all courts. See State v. Simpson, 91 Okla. Grim. 418, 219 P.2d 639 (1950).
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Carter and, relying on the source of information which had been the
basis for two of the three previous searches, chased Carter for thirteen
miles and forced him to stop. Upon a search of the car, which was performed without a warrant, twenty-three gallons of nontax-paid whiskey
were discovered. Carter was arrested and subsequently convicted in
the United States District Court.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in reversing the conviction and
rejecting the prosecution's contention that the "totality of the circumstances" supported a finding of probable cause, cited Wong Sun v.
United States27 for the proposition that since there was no observable
indication, prior to the chase, that there was contraband in the automobile,28 "a vague suspicion could not be transformed into probable
cause for arrest by reason of ambiguous conduct [flight] which the
'29
arresting officers themselves had provoked.
3o
3
l
The Cedeno and Carter cases indicate, therefore, that even
though the informer was not known to be reliable or was in fact unreliable, a conviction may be affirmed if there is substantial corroborating evidence discovered prior to the search and arrest.
While corroboration is always necessary if the informer is unreliable or not known to be reliable, there is a division in the cases as to
the necessity of corroboration when the information is received from
a reliable informer. There is authority holding that if the informer
is reliable, the information itself, completely divorced from supporting facts, will constitute a foundation for probable cause. 32 This rule
is followed by California.
An extreme application of this principle is found in People v.
Prewitt,3 3 in which information from an informant who had been

reliable in the past, but whose identity was not known, was held sufficient to sustain a finding of reasonable cause to validate an arrest
without a warrant. This case, by permitting the "past experience"
2 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
"In Koenann v. United States, 23o F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1956), in which a search of
a vehicle without a warrant was justified, officers observed that the automobile
appeared to be heavily loaded and was equipped with heavy duty springs and
oversized tires. There were no such indications in the Carter case.
-Supra note 25 at 338.
10Supra note 17.
"Supra note 25.
83People v. Prewitt, 52 Cal. 2d 330, 341 P.2d 1 (1959); People v. Boyles, 45 Cal.
2d 652, 290 P.2d 535 (1955); People v. Boyd, 162 Cal. App. 2d 332, 327 P.2d 913
(Dist. Ct. App. 1958); People v. Moore, 154 Cal. App. 2d 43, 315 P.2d 357 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1957); People v. Montes, 146 Cal. App. 2d 530, 303 P.2d 1o64 (Dist. Ct. App.
1956); Davis v. State, 377 P.2d 266 (Okla. Crim. 1962).
"Supra note 32.
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test to be extended from the field of the identified informer to the
area of an unidentified or anonymous informer, magnifies the extreme liberality of this line of authority.
There was early federal authority that adhered to the principle that
even reliable information had to be supported by verification or by
facts personally discovered by the officer. Such was the holding in
Gilliam v. United States34 where police observed illegal whisky in the
appellant's possession after being told by a reliable informer that appellant was bootlegging. This line of authority followed the proposition that although officers may use hearsay statements in evaluating
probable cause,35 such information, unless supplemented by additional
facts, is insufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause.
In ig6o, however, the United States Supreme Court in Jones v.
United States, 36 held that a search warrant may be issued upon hearsay statements received from a reliable informer. The Court, following
Draperv. United States,37 stated, "If an officer may act upon probable
cause without a warrant when the only incriminating evidence in his
possession is hearsay, it would be incongruous to hold that such evidence presented in an affidavit is insufficient basis for a warrant." 38
The courts have varied as to what is proper corroboration and as
to the cogency of the evidence sufficient to support a finding of probable cause when reliance is placed upon information received from an
informer. The character and strength of the corroboration required,
however, generally is dependent upon the reliability of the informer.
If the informer is unreliable, the strength of the corroboration re189 F.-d 321 (6th Cir. 1951). See also Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d
557 (6th Cir. 1948) (dictum); United States v. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 441 (D.D.C. 1953).
In United States v. Clark, 29 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Mo. 1939), the issue was
whether the tip from a reliable informer was sufficient to constitute probable
cause. Tbe court answered in the negative saying, "It seems to us that the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution . . .is whittled away to nothingness if it is held
that a citizen may be arrested and searched without a warrant of arrest or a
search warrant if only it is shown that some reliable informer has said the citizen
has committed or is committing a felony, without any showing whatever... that
the informer's information was itself more than mere guess-work and speculation."
Id. at 14o.
aUnited States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1951); United States v. Brougher,
19 F.R.D. 79 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
'362 U.S. 257 (1960).
3'358 U.S. 307 (1959).
3Supra note 36 at 270. Since this article was completed, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in Costello v. United States, 324 F.2d 260 ( 9 th Cir. 1963), expressly
stated that information from a reliable informer is sufficient in itself, without corroboration, to support a finding of probable cause for an arrest without a warrant.

